Abstract. Qualifying and ranking threat degrees of vulnerabilities in cloud service are known to be full of challenges. Although there have been several efforts aiming to address this problem, most of them are too simple or cannot be applied into cloud infrastructure. This paper aims to propose a novel framework to qualify and rank the vulnerabilities based on their threat degrees in cloud service. Through inputting or constructing service dependency graph, our framework is able to generate the importance degree of each service and the ranking list of all the vulnerabilities in cloud service. Moreover, our framework can be adopted not only into various cloud infrastructures, but also different categories of algorithms according to concrete requirements. To evaluate our framework, we adopt AssetRank algorithm into the framework, and present the whole design of our work. Comprehensive experiments prove the effectiveness of our framework on qualifying and ranking vulnerabilities in cloud service.
Introduction
Background. Cloud computing has become increasingly popular as the next infrastructure for hosting large-scale data and being adopted application softwares [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] . Moreover, cloud computing also provides a new business model where software services and core computing are outsourced on demand to third-party infrastructure such as Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [6], Microsoft's Azure Service Plantform [7] , and Rackspace's Mosso [8] . Specifically, cloud infrastructure is able to provide personalized business (e.g., a concrete transaction in E-Business) to each client; meanwhile, a business is composed of many services such as searching goods and payment in E-Business. On the other hand, this new business model also introduces a range of risks [9] . Because there are many dependency relationships among different services, adversary is able to overwhelm a whole business through attacking the vulnerabilities of some important services contained in that business. Here, we use important services to denote the services which are located at the "critical paths" in dependency relationships among services, and call important services' vulnerabilities as principal vulnerabilities. Obviously, the threat aiming to compromise principal vulnerabilities will badly influence the availability and reliability of cloud service 1 . For example, the business entity shown in Fig. 1 is executed by user Alice, and adversary Bob can easily compromise the whole business through exploiting and attacking the vulnerabilities of service S 3 instead of attacking the vulnerabilities of other services (e.g., S 2 , S 5 ). Therefore, computing and evaluating the threat degrees of vulnerabilities are known to be very important and challenging for current cloud services [10] .
Previous efforts. In order to address the above problem, some analytical technologies have been proposed. Specifically, CVSS [11] provides an general approach to score IT vulnerabilities. SANS [12] releases TOP 20 list of IT vulnerabilities and many organizations have used that list to patch the most dangerous vulnerabilities. However, previous threat analytical approaches and systems mainly aim to design general technologies. Namely, they do not pay much attention to the concrete application scenarios such as specific services in cloud infrastructure. Thus, they will fail to be adopted or cannot provide the effective and reasonable estimations of vulnerabilities. In addition, some of previous work fail to consider the qualification of vulnerabilities in services. Although there are indeed several mechanisms aiming to rank vulnerabilities or detect threats were proposed (e.g., CVSS [11] , and OWASP Top Ten [13] ), these efforts cannot clearly present services' prior relationships, thus making security administrators (i.e., cloud providers) cannot understand the security situations of whole businesses in cloud very well. Therefore, it is still a "pendent question": In order to enable cloud service to be more reliable, how to estimate and rank threat degrees of vulnerabilities in cloud service?
Our approach. In order to overcome the above challenges, this paper presents a novel framework which can be adopted into current cloud infrastructures. Our framework aims to address the problem of qualifying and ranking threat degrees of vulnerabilities in cloud service. Specifically, cloud providers (e.g., security administrators of cloud companies) can input the dependency relationships among services of various businesses into our framework, thus obtaining the ranking list of threat degrees of vulnerabilities existing in the whole infrastructure. Receiving the ranking list of threat degrees will enable cloud providers to know how to deal with the vulnerabilities and apply defenses; moreover, the list is also very useful and helpful to normal users who aim to understand whether there are threats in cloud or not. Notice that our framework can be adopted with various algorithms used to compute the importance degrees, and the concrete situation should be based on different requirements of availability and reliability in cloud service. Namely, our approach can qualify, estimate and rank the threat degrees of vulnerabilities which exists in different application scenarios of cloud service. The operation of our framework contains three key steps:
1. Cloud providers construct and input service dependency graph for all the services of some businesses. Sometimes, constructing service dependency graph is completed automatically by some softwares and applications. 2. Our framework computes and ranks threat degrees of all the vulnerabilities of those services, thus generating the ranking list based on threat degrees and obtaining the importance degrees of services. 3. Service providers provide effective solutions to the vulnerabilities which are pointed to own relatively high threat degrees.
In addition, our framework is able to map each vulnerability to specific services affected directly by that vulnerability, and then generates a set of services influenced by the vulnerabilities of the services. Actually, the service dependency graph should be provided by other components in cloud infrastructure automatically, because the dependency relationships among services should have been constructed when the configuration of any business is completed. Providing solutions should be based on the concrete requirement of the availability and reliability of a concrete business, since the two parts (i.e., availability and reliability) are trade-off in real-world adoption. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is the first effort to automatically calculate the importance degrees of services and rank vulnerabilities based on their threat degrees.
The organization of this paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will give the problem statement, system model and attack model in order to make our target clear. We will present the details of our framework in Section 3. The design of our prototype system and our evaluations on the framework will be shown in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Section 6 aims to present and discuss related work, and conclusions will be drawn in Section 7.
Problem Statement and Model
In order to clear the description of our framework, this section mainly presents the problem statement of our work (in Section 2.1), system model (in Section 2.2) and attack model (in Section 2.3).
Problem Statement
Our design is a general framework which can be adopted into any cloud infrastructure, where: 1) there are many businesses, and each of them is composed of some services which contain or do not contain vulnerabilities, 2) there are three groups of identities in the system -normal users, cloud provider and attackers, and 3) normal users aim to execute their desired businesses, and we can also call them as clients of cloud service. We assume that normal users and cloud providers are completely trusted. Namely, attackers are the only adversary in the whole cloud service. As shown in Fig. 2 , services dependency graph should be input into our framework. The framework computes the threat degree of each vulnerability according to those dependency relationships (i.e., services dependency graph), and outputs a ranking list of vulnerabilities to cloud providers or normal users. Responding to cloud providers or clients should depend on the concrete requirements. Notice that we use service dependency graph to denote the directed relationships among various services shown in Fig. 1 , and we call a list which ranks various vulnerabilities based on threat degrees of those vulnerabilities as ranking list of vulnerabilities' threat degrees.
In particular, the design of our framework aims to answer the following three questions: 1) which vulnerability is the most important (or the most dangerous)? 2) how to obtain threat degrees of services' vulnerabilities in cloud service? and 3) how to rank these vulnerabilities coming from different services? Notice that our framework does not pay much attention to the concrete algorithm which is leveraged to compute the threat degrees of vulnerabilities. The goal of our framework is to provide an approach to qualify and rank the vulnerabilities of different services and report the concrete situation on security to cloud providers, thus enabling normal users to avoid attacks which are launched by exploiting those vulnerabilities. Moreover, how to generate service dependency graph should be provided by other components of cloud service, e.g., businesses generator. That should not be our target.
System Model
In order to illustrate our description clearly, this section mainly presents system model. For a typical cloud service system, there are a large number of users (or clients) U = {u 1 , u 2 , ..., u n } connecting to cloud and using different businesses. Moreover, they can also communicate or interact with each other.
There are many businesses in cloud service. We use B = {B 1 , B 2 , ..., B n } to denote the set of businesses. Each business, actually, is composed of many services. We model the whole business (i.e., only a certain business) as a directed random graph
where BS i is a set of service tuples, and the set contains all the services in the ith business B i . Notice that we define S as the set of all the services. Obviously, we can have BS i ⊆ S. A i is defined to be the set of all the dependency (directed relationships) among services in the business B i . For each BS i , we have BS i = {bs 1 , bs 2 , ..., bs n } and service tuple is denoted to be bs j = serv j , V ul j , where serv j is a tuple which contains related information of the jth service in BS i , and V ul j is a set which includes different vulnerabilities of the jth service in BS i . The overview of our framework. Services S 1 through S n are used to be input into the generator of service dependency graph. The whole service dependency graph is input into our framework and then, based on service dependency graph, the concrete algorithm in the framework is able to generate a ranking list on the threat degrees of vulnerabilities.
Specifically, serv j = ID, Owners, ..., Content , where ID is this service's ID number, Owners is the owners and groups of this service, and Content is the description of the service's functions. V ul j = v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , where v k denotes the kth vulnerability in the whole set of vulnerabilities (i.e., V ul j ). A i , which is defined as the set of all the dependency among different services, is the set of directed edges from service bs m to another service bs n , where m = n. For a typical user u i , we define the user's behavior ub i ∈ U B as the set ub i = {e i,1 , e i,2 , ..., e i,n }, and define each e i,x ∈ ub i as the tuple e i,x = u i , B x . The tuple means a user u i perform an execution to the business B x which is located in cloud service.
Attack Model
In a typical cloud service, all the subjects (i.e., participants) can be grouped into three categories: normal users, cloud service providers, and attackers (i.e., adversary). Generally, a normal user can also be called client, and he or she should be a honest user. Attackers can be some computers controlled by adversary aiming to compromise some components (e.g., services and businesses) in cloud service. We assume that cloud providers are completely trusted, and adversary cannot compromise the hosts of cloud providers. Adversary can only launch attacks by using their computers or through controlling botnets networks [14] . Step 1
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The concrete adoptions in our Framework. Actually, as the input component of our framework, service dependency graph is firstly mapped to two matrixes. Through using two matrixes, the algorithm is able to qualify the threat degree for each vulnerability existing in the services which are from service dependency graph. In final step, a ranking list based on threat degrees of vulnerabilities is produced by our framework.
Normal users. We assume there are N normal users in cloud service. Their purposes are only to perform businesses in cloud, and they can be compromised by attackers.
Malicious users. We assume that malicious users are able to know what vulnerabilities are located in any given service, and what services are contained by a concrete business. Notice that we do not make any assumption of the numbers of normal users and attackers, since the two numbers are not related to our design and evaluations.
The Design of Our Framework
This section mainly presents the design of our framework. In our experiments, we adopt AssetRank algorithm into our framework. Namely, AssetRank algorithm is leveraged as the algorithm of threat degree in our framework. Therefore, the description of our framework is mainly based on AssetRank. Notice that AssetRank is only an instance of the actual utilization of our framework, and other algorithm computing importance degrees can also be adopted into the framework. Fig. 3 presents the details of components contained in our framework.
Background: AssetRank [15]
AssetRank algorithm is a generalization of the PageRank algorithm mainly used to rank web pages in web graphs. The study in [15] shows that AssetRank is able to address the unique semantics of dependency attack graphs and incorporates vulnerability data from public databases to compute metrics for the graph vertices which reveal their importance in attacks against the system. The algorithm treats the whole networking as a graph, and it is mainly used to be adopted to rank the importance degrees of a vertex in a dependency graph. Each numeric value computed by AssetRank is a direct indicator of how important the attack asset represented by a vertex is to a potential attacker. In fact, this category of rank-based metric will be valuable to users of attack graphs in better understanding the security risks, in fusing publicly available attack asset attribute data, in determining appropriate mitigation measures, and as input to further attack graph analysis tools. Actually, there are four contributions in AssetRank [15] . The first contribution is that AssetRank can correctly treat the AND and OR vertices in a dependency attack graph based on their logical meanings which cannot be done by PageRank algorithm [16] . The second contribution is the generalization of AssetRank which allows AssetRank to accurately model the various likelihoods of an adversary's capability to obtain privileges through means not captured in the graph. The third contribution is that using publicly available vulnerability information (e.g. CVSS [11] ) enables the importance degree of security problems to be computed on vulnerability attributes such as attack complexity. The fourth contribution is that the generalized ranking algorithm allows network defenders to obtain personalized AssetRank to reflect the importance of attack assets about the protection of specific critical network assets. Based on the above advantages, we adopt AssetRank into our framework to compute the threat degrees of vulnerabilities in cloud service. On the concrete details of AssetRank algorithm, please see [15] .
Calculation of Threat Degrees of Vulnerabilities
In our framework, because any given business is constructed by a group of services, any service (say, s i ) should be a component of one business entity. According to system model defined in Section 2.2, we define BS i as the set of services in B i ∈ B (i.e., B i denotes the ith business in the set of businesses). We use {bs j } |BSi| j=1 to denote each service in BS i . In addition, it is easy to know BS i ⊆ S.
Preparation work. From now on, our description will always be with respect to the calculation of the threat degree of a particular vulnerability v f . In fact, for this vulnerability (i.e., v f ), we need to know which businesses are influenced by it. However, we cannot obtain that information directly in the real system. In our work, we firstly need to know which services are influenced by the vulnerability v f , and define SV f = {sv f 1 , sv f 2 , ..., sv f n } to be the set of services containing vulnerability v f . We know that each business is composed of a group of services. If the vulnerability v f exists in a certain service and that service is located in some businesses, all the businesses will be affected by v f . Thus, through traversing all the businesses, we use BV f = {bv f 1 , bv f 2 , ..., bv f n } to denote the set of businesses including the vulnerability v f . Because vulnerability v f is located in multi-service and these services should be depended on multi-business. Therefore, vulnerability v f will influence one or more businesses and the threat degree of v f should be based on the importance degrees of multi-services.
Based on the above description, we need to obtain two vectors in order to achieve our final result (i.e., the threat degree of vulnerability v f ). The first vector is used to record which services are located in BS i , and the other one aims to record the services which own the vulnerabilities in v f . Notice that because our computation needs to traverse each business, we will obtain different BS i s. The first vector's target is to record the concrete services in each different BS i . For each business in BV f (say, B k ), we use f (·) to denote the first vector, and use h(·) to denote the second one. The concrete equation generating the first vector is shown as Equation (1).
In order to know the threat degree of a certain vulnerability, we need to know what services contain that vulnerability. As defined previously, for any service s i ∈ SV f , we can obtain the second vector by using Equation (2):
After obtaining two vectors, we can compute the importance degree of Business k through Equation 3 . In our work, we can also use impact of Business k to denote the importance degree of Business k.
where: -score(s i ): the importance degree of service s i computed by AssetRank algorithm.
Through traversing all the businesses, we use BV i = {bv 1 , bv 2 , ..., bv n } to denote the set of business containing the vulnerability v i . By using Equation 3, we need to compute all the Impact(bv i )s (i.e., Impact(bv 1 ), Impact(bv 2 ), ..., Impact(bv n )), and then compute the threat degree of each vulnerability v i in Business k, through using Equation 4.
Actually, it is easy to be found that the final results T hreat(v f ) must be computed based on all the above equations. In order to illustrate our approach clearly, we will present an example to illustrate the process of computing a concrete T hreat(v i ).
An Example
There is a service set S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 } in company A and these services construct the following business sequences: B 1 = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, B 2 = {s 2 , s 5 } and B 3 = {s 1 , s 3 , s 4 }. The percentages of B 1 , B 2 and B 3 are: B 1 = 20%, B 2 = 30% and B 3 = 50%. We assume that v 1 is located in service s 1 and s 2 , and v 2 is located in service s 2 . Businesses B 1 , B 2 and B 3 will be influenced by vulnerability v 1 , because B 1 and B 3 contain s 1 and B 2 contains s 2 . Thus, we can use Equation (5) to compute the above example.
Similarly, we also know the threat degree of v 2 :
We obtain the importance degree of each service in S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 } by using AssetRank. The concrete relationships and importance degrees are shown in 0.045 = 0.199. Based on the above results, we know how each vulnerability influence businesses and services. We reason the threat degree coming from vulnerability v 1 is larger than vulnerability v 2 . Therefore, we complete qualifying the threat degrees for vulnerabilities.
Implementation of Our Framework
This section mainly describes the design and implementation of our framework. Because our framework has not been adopted in real cloud infrastructure yet, we give the principal architecture and functions of each component in our prototype system. Fig. 5 , the architecture of our framework is composed of four principal components: 1) the acquisition of service dependency data, 2) the computation of importance degrees of services, 3) the computation of threat degrees of vulnerabilities, and 4) ranking manager. The description of each component is listed as follows:
Framework architecture. As shown in
-The acquisition of service dependency data. This component aims to generate service dependency data (e.g., information on dependency graph). In fact, the data can also be given from other components or modules in the system, because service dependency graph is generated by other functional components automatically in some cloud service systems.
Manager and Ranking
The -The computation of importance degrees for services. This component calculates the importance degree for each service after it receives the service dependency data.
In our current framework, we use AssetRank to realize that function. -The computation of threat degrees of vulnerabilities. This component contains three main functions: 1) to locate which services have special vulnerabilities, 2) to locate which business will be influenced by those special vulnerabilities, and 3) be used to calculate the threat degree of each vulnerability. -Ranking manager. This component is used to manage the above results and rank vulnerabilities based on their threat degrees.
Main functions of implementation.
In order to automatically calculate the threat degrees of vulnerabilities in an given business, we firstly need to know which services are influenced by a certain vulnerability. In our implementation, we design an function for mapping between vulnerability and service, and we name that function as VulnerabilityMapService. Besides the above work, we still should know which business is affected by existing vulnerabilities of services. The implementation in this paper designs another function for mapping existing vulnerabilities of services to some businesses. That function is called ServiceMapToBuiness. After knowing those existing vulnerability services and businesses, the implementation will be given the threat degree for each vulnerability.
Evaluation
To evaluate our framework, we use real data from Virtual Computing Laboratory (VCL) to generate the ranking list on the threat degrees of vulnerabilities. AssetRank algorithm 
is adopted as concrete mechanism of our framework. Then, we build a simulation experimental environment to verify whether the ranking list on the threat degree of vulnerabilities is accurate or not. Thus, we can say the evaluation mainly includes two steps: 1) the generation of ranking list with respect to the threat degree of vulnerabilities, and 2) evaluate that ranking list by using simulation.
VCL Environment
In order to evaluate our design, we introduce the real data from VCL into our experiment. Notice that due to the data's confidentiality, we have to adjust some of the data. There are four principal components contained in VCL: 1) end-user access interface, 2) VCL manager, 3) an image repository, and 4) computational, storage and networking hardware. Because we aim to evaluate vulnerabilities' security problems in VCL, we describe the VCL as a group of services from end-user perspective:
1. VCL access service. It is responsible for the service to provide an end-user access interface which is usually implemented by Linux, Apache and PHP. 2. VCL management service. The management service is responsible for all VCL resources such as blades, virtual machines and lab machines; meanwhile, it contains a scheduler, multi-site coordination, performance monitoring, and virtual network management. 3. VCL application service. These services are implemented by all application images which can be scheduled by VCL Management.
The above services in VCL work together to accomplish business coming from the end-user. The logical dependency graph of those services is shown in the Fig. 6 .
Ranking VCL's Vulnerabilities
In this section, we use real data to rank threat degrees of vulnerabilities in VCL. In order to guarantee privacy, we have processed and modified parts of data. We obtained reservation information on Feb. 18th VCL Application Services. The number of VCL application services for user request from reservation information can be extracted. Our main work is based on the following three steps: : Services dependency graph in VCL. s 1 denotes VCL access service. s 2 is used to denote VCL management services, and s 3 − s n is defined as VCL application services. A end-user accesses VCL through VCL access service s 1 to select from a menu, and a combination of applications, operating systems and VCL application services (s 3 − s n ) that are needed. VCL management service s 2 maps that requested image(s) onto available (possibly heterogeneous) hardware resources. 1. Based on the collection of the data, we compute these services dependency strength and generate the dependency data as the input of our framework, and according to the functions of our implementation, we can get the importance degree of each service in VCL. We established one matrix for businesses and services, as shown in Table 1 . 2. We know the vulnerability will exist in different VCL services. Based on Section 4, we built another matrix with vulnerabilities and services from CVE, as shown in Table 2 . In order to protect privacy of VCL, vulnerabilities in Table 2 are all assumed. 3. We use the framework to compute threat degree for each vulnerability and rank them. We make BSMatrix and VSMatrix as input of our framework and then automatically rank threat from these vulnerabilities, as shown in Table 3 .
From the above tables, we know that the biggest threat degree comes from the vulnerability named CVE-2008-5410 . We analyze that CVE-2008-5410 vulnerability exists in VCL service S 2 and all businesses depend on the service S 2 . If we assume that one vulnerability just only affect one VCL service, the result about ranking threat from these vulnerabilities have the same treat degree as service important value, as shown in Fig. 7 . Actually, we can easily get that our approach to rank threat vulnerabilities of VCL is strongly related to business and these ranking result will be helpful for security administration of images in VCL.
Evaluating Ranking List via Simulation
Goal of simulation. This section aims to answer a question: whether we can believe the ranking list from our framework? Actually, any algorithm or mechanism is able to provide a ranking list on vulnerabilities in a business, and it is also entirely possible that cloud provider and clients cast doubt to the ranking list produced by our framework. For example, Alice and Bob are able to provide two different ranking lists based on the threat degrees of vulnerabilities in the same cloud service. How can we judge which is correct? Therefore, how to prove whether our ranking list is correct or not is a principal goal for this section.
Why choose simulation?
We choose to use simulation to answer the above question based on the following reasons: 1) Simulation experiments enable us to study the performance of large-scale systems. Because most cloud companies tend to protect users' 2) Simulation experiments enable us to generate our wanted attacking forms which cannot be obtained from the real-world traces; 3) We generate experimental environments totally based on the measurement results of real-world and practical distributions. Therefore, the authenticity and persuasion of simulation experiments are able to be insured completely. To sum up, experiments based simulation can fulfill the goals of our evaluations. Details of our simulation. Our simulation-based experiment is mainly composed of three steps: 1.
Step I. We build simulation environment (i.e., infrastructure) based on the description on EC2 in [6] , and adopt real data (e.g., service entity and vulnerabilities shown in Table 1 ) into our environment. 2.
Step II. We attack each vulnerability respectively, and respectively calculate the total performance 2 of all the businesses after compromising every vulnerability. Namely, when we attack the first vulnerability, we compute the total performance of all the businesses (shown in Table 1 ) as the result of attacking the first vulnerability, and then calculate the whole performance when launching attack to the second vulnerability as the second result, and so on. Thus, we are able to obtain many different results of performances under the situation that various vulnerabilities are attacked. 
3.
Step III. We compare those results with our ranking list. It will prove our ranking list is correct if the low to high order of performance results matches our ranking list -the high to low order of threat degrees of vulnerabilities.
Notice that the performance is only a metric in our simulation. It has no any concrete semantic, and, actually, we do not need to give the performance any concrete semantic, because our simulation only focuses the order of total performances but not the meaning of those performances. . Actually, this order correctly matches the ranking list produced by our framework. Therefore, we can say our ranking list is proved to be correct by our simulation experiment.
Related Work
Our work mainly focuses on ranking vulnerabilities in cloud service based on their threat degrees. There are some previous efforts aiming to address this problem. The CVSS [11] is a general approach which proposes standardized mechanism to rate IT vulnerabilities; however, CVSS fails to provide any mechanism being able to calculate businesses' impacts in the application scenario of cloud service. On the other hand, in order to overcome this problem, our approach applies AssetRank algorithm which is able to achieve this goal in cloud service. In fact, we further explore the semantic of AssetRank results which are used to calculate the importance degrees of services in cloud service. Moreover, many efforts (e.g., [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] ) aiming at the dependency relationships discovery of services have been developed. Specifically, Sujoy Basu et al. [17] used automatical identification of dependency traces of messages to discover dependency relationships of Web services and is able to detect the dynamics of those services' relationships. Paul Barham et al. [18] proposed Constellation which applies the timings of packet transmission and reception to infer the complicated relationships between hosts and services. Christian Ensel presented an approach to automatically generate service dependency models which is implemented by agents [19] . Xu Chen et al. [20] implemented Orion system and used packet headers and timing information in network traffic to discover dependencies. However, these previous efforts only concentrated on how to discovery service dependency relationships. In contrast, our approach differs from them and we study how to leverage services' dependency relationships to rank all the vulnerabilities according to their threat degrees in cloud service.
Conclusion
In this paper, we design a novel framework to qualify and rank the threat degrees of vulnerabilities. Our contributions mainly present an approach which is used to calculate both threat degrees of vulnerabilities and importance degrees of services. As an instance, we adopt AssetRank algorithm into the framework. After present the whole design of our framework, we use simulation experiments to prove the effectiveness of the framework with respect to qualifying and ranking vulnerabilities in cloud service.
